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Abstract—In this paper we study the correlation of node
failures in time and space. Our study is based on measurements
of a production high performance computer over an 8-month
time period. We draw possible types of correlations between
node failures and show that, in many cases, there are direct
correlations between observed node failures. The significance of
such a study is twofold: achieving a clearer understanding of
correlations between node failures and enabling failure detection
as early as possible. The results of this study are aimed at
helping the system administrators minimize (or even prevent)
the destructive effects of correlated node failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The failure rate of high performance computers rapidly
increases due to their growth in size and complexity. Failures,
thus, become the norm rather than the exception. There are
several de-facto failure recovery mechanisms for high perfor-
mance computers (e.g., checkpoint-restart, duplication, and re-
execution). The efficiency of recovery mechanisms depends on
the mean time between failures (MTBF). It is expected that in
the near future, the MTBF of high performance computers
becomes too short, such that current de-facto failure recovery
mechanisms will no longer be able to recover the system
from failures [1]. Early failure detection is a new class of
failure recovery methods which can be beneficial for high
performance computers with low MTBF. Detecting failures in
their early stage can reduce their negative effects by preventing
propagation of their side effects to other parts of the system [2].
One way to detect failures in their early stage is via mon-
itoring the nodes’ behavior and seeking behavioral anomalies.
Performance is a key property of high performance computers.
To prevent any performance penalty due to actively probing of
nodes, we employ a passive monitoring approach. The native
Linux message logging (also referred to as syslog) is the source
of our monitoring information. The syslog daemon, records
ongoing hardware- and software-related events of the system.
In this paper, we refer to such hardware/software events in the
syslog as syslog entries.
When studying failures, the granularity of components
plays an important role in interpreting the system behavior.
As long as a node behaves as expected, it can withstand
failures. When a node is unable to carry out its expected
load, it is viewed as a “node outage”. Certain failures will
lead to node outages (e.g., a failed switch). A node outage
is an observable indication of a failure occurrence. A node
outage is defined as the case when no syslog entries from a
particular node can be observed. We consider three reasons
for node outages: (1) site-wide power outages, (2) planned
maintenance, and (3) other reasons. In this study we focus on
the failures observed at the node level and derive correlations
along three dimensions. (1) Temporal: denotes cases when the
time gap between consecutive failures falls below a certain
threshold; (2) Spatial: denotes cases when the failed nodes
share a physical resource (e.g., chassis); and (3) Logical:
denotes cases when the failed nodes share a logical resource
(e.g., batch job).
The main contribution of this paper is a detailed study that
aims to help the system administrators minimize the destructive
effects of correlated node failures.
Our methodology is based on a cyclic workflow, as follows:
System monitoring → Analysis of monitoring data → Deriva-
tion of correlations → Early failure detection → Timely failure
prediction. In this paper we concentrate on ”derivation of
correlations”. The subsequent steps are part of future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Distributed computer systems are hierarchically structured,
e.g., system, cluster, rack, and node. Furthermore, such systems
share various resources, such as power supply units, network,
or (distributed) file systems. As a result, failures in one
location may trigger further failures and, as such, propagate
between different system components. Failure correlations can
be classified into temporal, spatial, logical, and combinations
thereof.
Yigitbasi et al. [3] investigated the temporal correlation of
failures in large-scale distributed systems. The examined event
logs featured strong daily patterns and high auto-correlation.
Sahoo et al. [4] analyzed event logs of heterogeneous servers
and also found different forms of strong correlation structures
including significant periodic behavior. A proactive failure
prediction system considering the temporal order of the events
was described by Sahoo et al. [5].
Liang et al. [6] analyzed logs from an IBM BlueGene/L
system and found skewness in the distribution of network
failures. Gallet et al. [7] used a moving window to generate
groups of spatially correlated failures from empirical data.
They showed that spatial correlation of failures cannot be
neglected for an accurate analysis of system downtimes. Fu
et al. [8] processed event logs to identify event dependencies
in order to improve failure prediction and root cause diagnosis.
Fu and Xu [9] enhanced this approach by taking into
account both temporal and spatial correlations. Their model
used event clustering to quantify the temporal correlation and
developed another model to characterize spatial correlation.
They showed that failure events exhibit strong correlations in
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Figure 1. Taurus topology - I, R,C, and n stand for island, rack, chassis, and
node, respectively. Nodes, chassis, and racks shown in different shades of the
same color are located in same island and they are in close proximity to each
other.
the time and space domains. Tang and Iyer [10] proposed c-
and p-dependent models to estimate reliability for systems with
two- and multi-way correlations, respectively.
In this work, we examine event logs and focus on iden-
tifying both temporal and spatial correlations of failures. We
want to share our knowledge gained via these observations
with the community and provide the foundation for early
failure detection techniques. As future work, we will extend
our analysis with batch job allocation information gathered
from the batch system to correlate the jobs affected by the
same failure.
III. SYSTEM MONITORING
Taurus1 is a general purpose production high performance
computing (HPC) system at Technische Universita¨t Dresden,
Germany. It consists of three partitions called islands and
has a total of 494 compute nodes. The first island has 4320
Intel E5-2690 (Sandy Bridge) 2.90GHz cores (270 nodes), the
second island in addition to the 704 Intel E5-2450 (Sandy
Bridge) 2.10GHz cores, is also equipped with 88 NVidia
Tesla K20x GPUs (44 nodes), while the third island has 2160
Intel X5660 (Westmere) 2.80GHz cores (180 nodes). The total
peak performance is 137 TFlop/s (without GPUs). Taurus is
powered by Bullx Linux and uses Slurm as batch system.
The Taurus structure is shown in Fig. 1 and will be used
as the reference for numbering the nodes. The native Linux
syslog-ng daemon runs on all compute nodes. The login node
aggregates the syslog files from all compute nodes. The syslog
daemon on the login node is configured to push all syslog
entries to a storage space outside of the cluster. Regardless of
the content of syslog entries, we consider each syslog entry
as a heartbeat of its respective generating node. Using these
heartbeats one can monitor the liveliness of the nodes and, as
such, determine whether a node is dead (no heartbeat) or alive
(has heartbeat). Fig. 1 shows that nodes with consecutive node
IDs are, in fact, located physically next to each other. Based on
this information, in Fig. 2 we can see that the number of node
outages for those nodes which are physically next to each other
is more or less equal. These observations motivate the present
study and the search for temporal and spatial correlations of
node failures on Taurus.
The system was monitored over an 8-month period from
01-09-2014 to 30-04-2015. Within this period a total of 1669
node outages were observed. Considering all outages of all
nodes during the 8-month period, leads to an average meantime
between node outages (MTBO) of 3.65 hours. The formula
used to calculate the MTBO is MTBO=
∑
TBO
N , in which, TBO
1https://doc.zih.tu-dresden.de/hpc-wiki/bin/view/Compendium/
SystemTaurus#Phase 1
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Figure 2. Total number of outages for each node, over an 8-month period
from 01-09-2014 to 30-04-2015. The total number of node outages is 1669.
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Figure 3. Syslog entries of a healthy node (n482) over one hour on 28-04-
2015. The main pattern is shown in blue and pattern repetition is shown in
gray.
is the interval between two consecutive node outages and N is
the total number of outages on Taurus in the 8-month period
of study.
Each island of Taurus is intended for a different use. The
percentage of node outages within each island is as follows,
I1: 65.12%, I2: 13%, and I3: 21.86%. By having a closer look
at the outage percentage of each island we realized that the
second island (containing GPUs) is responsible only for a very
small share of outages and, therefore, we decided to focus our
correlation study on the first and third islands.
IV. WORKFLOW FOR NODE FAILURE DETECTION
Each individual compute node generates its own syslog
entries and transmits them to the master (usually a login)
node. Therefore, upon outage of a certain node, no further
syslog entry is received from that node. This results in a
common problem shared by all remote-access systems: it is
not possible to truly indicate whether a node is dead, too busy
to respond, or simply lost its connectivity. However, the effect
is the same, regardless of the cause: the particular node can no
longer be used. Therefore, we count all the above situations
as a node outage. Common services and daemons run on each
node and some of them regularly generate log entries. If the
time between two log entries exceeds an expected amount of
time (i.e., a timeout threshold), we can assume a node outage
occurs. As an example, Fig. 3 shows the number of syslog
entries generated by node 482 over one hour. A repetitive
pattern of syslog entries is visible.
Syslog-based monitoring is not sufficiently accurate and
results in many false positive node outages. The time precision
of our monitoring data is 1 second. The minimum time
between syslog entries is, however, less than 1 second. The
maximum time, even for a single node, is not constant and
might change over time as a result of modifications in hardware
or software. In general, the time between syslog entries on
Taurus nodes during the 8-month time period of this study was
always below 10 minutes. When a problematic node instantly
reboots after an outage, the time between two consecutive
heartbeats will be less than the expected mean time between
syslog entries (MTBSLE), in our case below 10 minutes, thus,
contributing to a false negative by hiding the node outage.
The alternative method used in this study is tracking back
the system reboots to avoid false positives and false negatives
as much as possible. Using this method we first seek syslog
entries which indicate a node reboot; then we track back in the
syslog entries to find the last available syslog entry before the
reboot line. We consider the last recorded syslog entry before a
system reboot as the outage point. Although we know that the
node might be still alive after its last syslog entry, since it is no
longer responsive, we consider it to be out. On Taurus, the first
observable entry in the syslog output after a successful boot of
the operating system is syslog-ng starting up; version *.
After finding all node outages using this alternative method
we use a partial heartbeat tracking method (described earlier)
to extract all remaining node outages from the syslog. In the
partial heartbeat tracking we compare the timestamp of the
last available syslog entry of each node against 30-04-2015
23:59:59. If the difference between these two timestamps is
more than 10 minutes (i.e., MTBSLE), we assume a node
outage.
V. ANALYSIS AND CORRELATION OF NODE FAILURES
Among the three dimensions of failure correlation (time,
space, and logic), the most relevant one is the logical dimen-
sion as it can help prevent re-occurrence of the same failure in
the future, or even enable the prevention of failure propagation.
However, this correlation is the hardest to infer. Oftentimes
the logic behind a group of failures is so complex that we can
easily miss the correlation, and therefore we might assume
that the failures were uncorrelated (false negative correlation).
In this study we attempt to clarify that whenever the logical
correlation between node failures is not immediately visible,
we can analyze the other two dimensions (time and space)
of failure correlation and infer the existence or absence of a
logical correlation between failures. Logical correlations have
the highest potential for early node failure detection.
First insight: By definition, logical correlations are derived
from strong correlations in space and time [11].
For the use cases included in this work, we selected only
those node outages which we believe were not caused by
general power outages or scheduled system maintenances.
Therefore, these outages are considered as node failures. In
the remainder of this section we refer to node failure simply
as failure. We study several use cases which had the same
type of correlations and select the most illustrative one as the
representative of those types of correlations. In the following
subsections we discuss four such use cases as the representative
of their respective group of correlation.
1) First use case: Fig. 4a shows 15 failures during a period
of 24 hours on December 6, 2014 on Taurus. The failures
are divided into eight different temporal sections. Since two
sections have only one failure, no temporal correlation ap-
plies. The remaining 6 sections indicate temporal correlations
between failures. The color pattern also indicates the spatial
failure correlation in all of the 8 sections. In this use case the
temporal correlation is very weak, and with the exception of
one section, the sections have only 2 failures each.
In Fig. 4b, color coding is used to show the correlation
between failures in time and space. The last row indicates the
similarity of reasons for failures (logical correlation) on each
chassis, which we extracted from the syslog entries.
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(a) Node failures over 24 hours on 06-12-2014. Temporally correlated
failures are shown in several different horizontally divided sections. All
failures with same color pattern are also spatially correlated, regardless of
their section.
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(b) Correlation of node failures over 24 hours on 06-12-2014. Temporal
correlation can be a sign of identical reason for a group of failures only
when it appears between 3 or more nodes. Otherwise, most likely the
simultaneous occurrence of two failures even at the exact same moment is
simply a coincidence.
Figure 4. First use case: Observed failures and their correlations.
In all other similar figures in this section, the following
patterns were found. (1) Failures with identical color in the
time row occurred in less than a certain amount of time after a
previous failure. (2) Failures with identical color in the chassis,
rack, or island rows, occurred in the same chassis, rack, or
island, respectively, as the failures preceding them in these
locations. (3) Failures with identical color in the reason row,
occurred due to the same reason as other failures on this day.
By looking at Fig. 4b, we can see that only the section with
3 failures has identical colors in the reason row. The failures
occurring on 4 out of the 6 nodes located on I1.R1.C5 are
spatially correlated and have the same reason for failure.
Lesson 1: On Taurus, if a temporal correlation is being
detected only between two compute nodes, even if both failures
occurred in the exact same moment, we cannot correlate
the reason(s) behind those failures, and most likely their
simultaneous occurrence is just a coincidence. A strong tem-
poral correlation between failures occurring on three or more
compute nodes, in many cases, implies an identical failure
reason.
2) Second use case: In Fig. 5a we observe a group of 22
failures over 24 hours on April 21, 2015 on Taurus. Failures
are divided into four temporal sections, out of which one of
them has only a single failure and is, therefore, excluded from
further correlation analysis. The first observation regarding the
spatial correlation of failures in Fig. 5a is the fact that all
failures occurred on the first island.
Fig. 5b shows that except for a single failure, the remaining
21 failures are caused by the same reason. Via backtracking
the system logs, we realized that the 21 failures were raised by
a problem in the distributed file system, and the failure with a
different reason was due to an out of memory problem.
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(a) Node failures over 24 hours on 21-04-2015. Temporally correlated
failures are shown in three different horizontally divided sections. All
failures with same color pattern are also spatially correlated, regardless
of their section.
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(b) Correlation of node failures over 24 hours on 21-04-2015. The number
of correlated failures plays an important role. In each group of correlated
failures, the dimension which has more correlations is the dominant one.
Figure 5. Second use case: Observed failures and their correlations.
Lesson 2: Complementary to Lessons 1, we learned that
on Taurus, when the number of correlated failures is rela-
tively high, the spatial correlation dominates. When inferring
correlations and analyzing reasons of failures, the highest
priority should be given to spatial correlations followed by
temporal correlations. The chances of finding the same reason
for spatially correlated failures are higher than in the case of
temporally correlated failures.
3) Third use case: Fig. 6a shows 8 failures over 24 hours
on December 14, 2014 on Taurus. Based on their time of
occurrence, failures are divided into a group of six and a group
of two failures. By backtracking the system logs, we realized
that all failures were due to an out of memory problem, which
implies a problem related to a shared logical resource (e.g., a
job). The temporal correlation in the second group is strong. A
stronger correlation is observable in Fig. 6b along the spatial
dimension.
Lesson 3: On Taurus, the combination of temporal and
spatial correlations is highly revealing. In situations in which
both strong temporal and spatial correlations are observable,
the reason behind the failure is identical. This lesson can reveal
the logical correlation of failures in situations which the logical
correlation is not independently detectable.
4) Fourth use case: Fig. 7 shows all outages on Taurus
during the 8-month period of 01-09-2014 to 30-04-2015. Since
this use case covers all outages on Taurus, the small share of
second island is also demonstrated. A similarity in the number
of outages on many chassis of the same rack and same island
is observable.
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(a) Node failures over 24 hours on 14-12-2014. Temporally correlated
failures are shown in two different horizontally divided sections. All failures
with same color pattern are also spatially correlated, regardless of their
section.
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(b) Correlation of node failures over 24 hours on 14-12-2014.
A strong temporal and spatial correlation in a group of failures,
strongly implies an identical reason for all observed failures.
Figure 6. Third use case: Observed failures and their correlations.
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Figure 7. Fourth use case: Node failures over an 8-month period from
01-09-2014 to 30-04-2015. Chassis in the same rack and racks in the same
island exhibit spatial correlation even over a longer period of time (no temporal
correlation is made here).
Each red block indicates the total number of outages in a
single chassis over the 8-month period of this study. General
power outages and general planned maintenances affect the
entire cluster. The number of planned partial maintenances
is very limited. In Fig. 7 we group the outages in blocks
of 20. Therefore, the correlation observable between outages
illustrated in Fig. 7, is also a valid correlation between failures.
Lesson 4: On Taurus, if failures are not distinguishable
from general power outages and planned maintenances, we
can simply use node outages for analyzing the long term
correlations between failures of the entire cluster, rather than
using actual failure syslog entries.
Revisiting the above use cases, one can see that regardless
of the correlation being temporal or spatial, in all cases the
reason row in Fig. 4b, 5b, and 6b, follows almost the same
color pattern as at least one of the other columns, implying
logical correlation.
Early node failure detection can be achieved via two
methods: (1) identifying the reason behind the failures (logical
correlation) which is not always easy or (2) identifying the
temporal and/or spatial correlation of failures, which indirectly
reveals the logical correlations. Finally, we can state that all
nodes which have the probability to have the same logical
correlation will eventually encounter failures.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we report on the lessons learned while
correlating node failures observed via the system logs obtained
on a production HPC system over eight months. We learned
that the logical correlation in general is derivable from the
temporal and spatial correlation of failures. When a shared
physical resource is responsible for a group of failures, we
should observe failures with strong spatial correlation which
are also temporally correlated. We recall that the temporal
correlation is only meaningful when it is observed on more
than two failures. When we observe a large group of failures,
usually the spatial correlation plays the key role in identifying
the main cause of failure.
This work is a first step in detecting and correlating node
failures. Only based on a deeper understanding of the failure
patterns and their correlations, effective failure recovery and
prediction mechanisms can be devised. In general on Taurus
many failures are temporally correlated, spatially correlated,
or both, depending on the time interval within our examined
8-month time period. This variation is mainly caused by the
different ways of using the system over time; this naturally
leads to the need for logical correlation. The logical correlation
is not always easy to infer. In this study we learned that logical
correlation can more easily be revealed by further examination
of the strong spatially-temporally correlated failures. This
study is, however, not yet completed. To be able to detect early,
diagnose, and correlate generic failures, further investigation
and analysis is needed for a generic failure diagnosis and
correlation methodology, which is part of our future work.
At the conclusion of the study, such a generic failure
diagnosis and correlation methodology could be used to detect
and prevent failures in a shorter time and more efficiently
than the techniques used nowadays. In the next phase, we will
study the logical correlation of failures. With knowledge of all
three types of correlations (temporal, spatial, and logical) we
will begin to identify correlation patterns that can help detect
failures in their early stage or even predict them.
As future work further investigation of the logical correla-
tion is planned. Also, the automation of the analysis workflow
will be very beneficial. More accurate extraction of actual
failures from all node outages is also necessary. In this work,
we began the analysis using the available information, out of
which, node outages were the most prominent types of failures.
Therefore, for the analysis of future system logs we know how
to interpret node reboots and we can proceed to analyze other
types of node outages. We agree that the current results would
be more accurate if other types of node outages would be taken
into account. This is planned as part of our future work. Based
on the current study we cannot claim that the discussed failures
and correlations are representatives of other HPC systems. The
focus of this paper is not to find similarities in the failure
patterns we observe on Taurus with other HPC systems, but to
develop a methodology that can be applied to other systems as
well. During the time of writing of this study, a new computing
system (Taurus2) has been installed at Technische Universita¨t
Dresden, as a second part of the system which we reported
about (Taurus). Our hope is that lessons learned from Taurus
will facilitate the failure monitoring-detection-prevention of
Taurus2. Using the proposed analysis workflow on the system
logs of other HPC systems and comparing their results with
the lessons we learned during this study can provide a more
general insight about HPC systems behavior and will help in
early detection of failures.
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